The Law Merchant is depicted today as a transnational system based on merchant practice operating outside the fabric of national law. It is conceived as cosmopolitan in nature, universal in application, expertly delivered, and independent of other regulatory systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite attracting voluminous commentary, a universally acceptable definition of the Law Merchant remains elusive. Since its origins in pre-medieval times, the institution and definition of the Law Merchant have undergone significant change. At its core, it encompasses a trans-regional system by which merchants regulate their own affairs irrespective of the immediate locations of those transactions or the nationalities of the merchant traders. As was echoed in Luke v Lyde: 'Mercantile law is not the law of a particular country but the law of all nations.' able to function efficiently and fairly as a merchant regime run by transnational merchant judges and set apart from local laws prescribed by local rulers.
3 Its durability is in being able to satisfy the trans-regional interests of itinerant merchants who travel with their goods and wares from port to port, fair to fair, and market to market. Its continuity is ensured because local rulers explicitly or implicitly support its operation in their own and their subjects' economic and political interests. The result is a system of Law Merchant justice that responds to a plurality of constituencies engaged in transnational trade and investment, including itinerant merchants, domestic rulers, and local and foreign communities. 4 merchants at distinct moments in time, place and space. Far from homogenising the divergent interests of merchants, non-merchants and local rulers into a single transnational legal order, the Law Merchant compounds such divergence. 6 This article examines these conflicting conceptions of the Law Merchant. It scrutinises the history of the Law Merchant as a supposedly cosmopolitan system of law and its alleged transformation into a twenty-first century Law Merchant. It disputes narrow monist conceptions that are ascribed to it, underscoring the plural attributes of the Law Merchant. The purpose is to promote a functional approach towards the Law Merchant that is contemporary, that is responsive to the aspirations of transnational merchants, and that accommodates the political and social interests of modern states and their subjects.
In stressing the plural attributes of the Law Merchant, this article challenges both historical and contemporary autonomy values that are sometimes imputed to a unified system of merchant law. 7 It disputes the economic rationale that the Law Merchant evolved spontaneously out of the practices and usages of merchants. 8 It contests the image of a sixteenth century liberal Law Merchant that evolved naturally into our contemporary post-liberal era. 9 It questions the extent to which the Law Merchant was uniformly 'nationalised' by nation-states in the sixteenth century and 'transnationalised' by those self-same nation-states along pluralistic lines today. 10 It concludes by examining how Law Merchant values are institutionalised today, notably through the development of transnational commercial arbitration.
II. THE MANY FACES OF LAW MERCHANT AUTONOMY
The title 'Law Merchant' does not provide a complete account of how merchants currently regulate, or historically regulated, their own affairs institutionally, systemically or functionally. In addition, the notion of merchant autonomy is insufficiently capable of signifying who or what was, or is, autonomous under the Law Merchant. This section reconceptualise commerce and ultimately accounted for the demise of corporatism, culminating in the revolution of 1789). 6 The 'romance' of the Law Merchant was captured, albeit without cynicism, in the title of a widely cited book extolling its virtues: Wyndham Anstis Bewes, The Romance of the Law Merchant (Sweet & Maxwell, 1986 [1923 ). See also Jacob Goodyear, 'The Romance of the Law Merchant' (1930) 34 Dickinson Law Review 218, 225 (giving a romanticised image of the Law Merchant). 7 See Part II. 8 explores plural conceptions of autonomy to create a preliminary framework for subsequent analysis.
A. A Spontaneous Law Merchant?
The historical Law Merchant is sometimes depicted by libertarians as an exemplification of 'spontaneous ordering ' . 11 This rests on the proposition that merchant judges devised merchant law out of merchant practice spontaneously, or, in liberal terminology, freely and voluntarily. 12 Central to this allegedly spontaneous ordering of trans-regional merchant law are three factors: the value placed on the autonomy of itinerant merchants to interact at will, the separation between spontaneously evolving merchant laws and peremptory laws imposed on them by municipal systems of law, and a utilitarian priority accorded to merchant laws that derived from merchant practice as distinct from superimposed sources of law. 13 Exemplifying the spontaneity of the historical Law Merchant is the rationale that medieval merchants freely determined the price of goods, while merchant judges decided whether that price was 'just' and 'reasonable' according to mercantile perceptions of fairness and expediency.
14 A spontaneously ordered Law Merchant also infers that merchants are autonomous in being free to conclude agreements, such as to make choices of law and arbitration to suit their mercantile expectations. 15 The source of their autonomy resides in merchant responsive laws that are crafted by experienced merchant judges out of merchant usage, as distinct from domestic laws imposed on merchant practice. 16 The inferred result is 11 
B. The Plural Boundaries of Merchant Autonomy
The study of an evolving Law Merchant invites different accounts of its origins, operative features, and political significance. One such account is to identify the different autonomy values that are associated with it; to evaluate the range of plural meanings that are accorded to such autonomy values; and to assess the extent to which they complement or contradict one another in discrete merchant contexts.
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Under a plural conception of the Law Merchant, the first kind of autonomy value is the alleged formal and institutional independence of the Law Merchant from other legal or merchant orders. 23 An illustration is the formal independence of pre-medieval merchant codifications-like the Rolls of Oléron and the Laws of Rhodes-from local laws and customs. 24 The second kind of autonomy value is the functional independence imputed to Law Merchant institutions, such as the functional independence of the eighteenth century merchant court in Paris from national law courts. 25 The third kind of autonomy value is in ascribing substantive autonomy of merchant laws, such as in attributing the development of distinctive conceptions of the 'just price' to the Law Merchant. 26 The fourth kind of autonomy value relates to the procedural autonomy of merchant courts, such as the procedures followed by assemblies of merchants participating in deliberations at the medieval fairs of St Ives. 27 The fifth kind of autonomy is associated with the with Piepoudre, or 'dusty feet' , courts in regulating merchant disputes expeditiously. 28 The sixth kind of autonomy derives from the presupposed independence of the Law Merchant from other systems of law, such as from Roman and canon law. 29 These different kinds of autonomy values do not necessarily accurately or exhaustively define the Law Merchant. Nor do they provide a fully integrated account of it. Indeed, the very insistence that the Law Merchant entails multiple and competing autonomy values entails recognising that the Law Merchant never was wholly institutionally, formally, substantively, or functionally autonomous. 30 However, these different accounts of the autonomy of the Law Merchant underscore variable conceptions that can help to explain it, including the extent to which those conceptions may be incommensurable with one another in discrete contexts. A plural conception of an autonomous Law Merchant also helps to elucidate, without necessarily reconciling, a heterogeneous range of culturally and politically imbued values. 31 For example, the institutional autonomy of the medieval Law Merchant was associated with its independence as a mercantile system that functioned apart from other regulatory systems. This institutional autonomy was distinct from the autonomy of merchants who functioned within it in a medieval era preceding the creation of the liberal state. 32 In contrast, the sixteenth century Law Merchant was characterised not by its institutional autonomy as a system of merchant justice, but by the autonomy of individual merchants to interact freely within it. 33 Merchants allegedly enjoyed not only the classical liberty to contract at will, but the freedom to exclude national or transnational regulation in their mutual dealings. 34 The supposition is that they were regulated, not by an institutionalised Law Merchant, but by their voluntarily concluded agreements 35 and their duties to perform those agreements 'in good faith' .
36
The challenge in ascribing autonomy values to the Law Merchant today is to reconcile conflicting autonomy values that extend beyond both the institutional independence of the Law Merchant and the individual autonomy of merchants themselves. 37 Consider the proposition that the medieval Law Merchant represented a self-regulating institution created by merchants to govern their conduct, such as by entering into 'pacts' which medieval merchant courts enforced. A questionable inference is that medieval merchants enjoyed the capacity to conclude pacts in the absence of any understanding of modern liberty that evolved subsequently in the sixteenth century. 38 A further difficulty is to determine how to reconcile the rights of transnational merchants to conclude 'pacts' as 'free' agents in the sixteenth century with the institutional autonomy ascribed to the medieval Law Merchant that supposedly prevailed over their individual autonomy. 39 Equally difficult to reconcile is a twenty-first century Law Merchant that allegedly includes different conceptions of institutional autonomy, along with different conceptions of the autonomy of merchants to contract freely within it. 40 As an illustration, merchant 'pacts' today include complex choices of national and transnational law which transnational merchants are expected to make freely. 41 However, those 'pacts' are subject to a plethora of bilateral and multilateral trade and investment agreements that circumscribe that freedom. 42 See Trakman (n 2) 10-12 (discussing the institutional regulation of medieval merchant pacts). Multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements in the 21st century are undoubtedly more complex than the pacts between medieval merchants, the treaties between local principalities, and the fealty foreign merchants showed to local potentates. But it would be an overstatement to conclude that pacts between medieval merchants were straightforward while modern investment and trade agreements are not. The complexity of agreements also hinges on the discrete socio-cultural and political context, which is not fixed in time, place or space. See Part VI.A-B.
One response is that, in a twenty-first century Law Merchant, merchants enjoy an autonomy to contract subject to how effectively and fairly they exercise that autonomy, such as how they negotiate agreements governing the settlement of their disputes. Another response is that twenty-first century transnational merchants enjoy, not per se autonomy rights, but privileges that regulators accord to them selectively. 43 It depicts a Law Merchant that is strategically dominated by transnational merchants who have the financial resources and political influence to secure those privileges in fact. One means of reconciling different accounts of the autonomy of transnational merchants in our post-liberal transnational order is to make a plural assessment of merchant-responsive ways of regulating their own affairs and merchant-directed ways in which regulators extend or constrain that autonomy. That plural assessment includes, among other factors, the cultural, political and economic interests of transnational merchants in shackling themselves to, or freeing themselves from, the territorial constraints of state authorities. 44 The autonomy of a twenty-first century Law Merchant is also contingent on the reasons for and manner in which nation-states, acting unilaterally or multilaterally, regulate merchant institutions and individual merchants.
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A plural inference is that the autonomy values ascribed to a twenty-first century Law Merchant stem neither wholly from autonomous merchant practices, nor solely from peremptory legal directives imposed by states on them, but from a functional permutation of values that includes but also supersedes both.
III. THE LAW MERCHANT'S HISTORICAL LEGITIMACY
The brief historical overview of the Law Merchant and its concomitant assumptions that follows is intended to provide an institutional and functional framework within which to consider competing autonomy-enhancing and autonomy-limiting values ascribed to the modern Law Merchant following the sixteenth century.
The eighteenth century jurist William Blackstone grounded the post-medieval Law Merchant of his day in merchant custom, which he viewed as universal in application, independent of municipal law and local rulers, and guided primarily, if not exclusively, by the demands of transnational trade. Blackstone stated:
[A] particular system of customs … called the custom of merchants, or lex mercatoria … is … allowed, for the benefit of trade, to be of the utmost validity in all commercial transactions … [A]s these are transactions carried on between subjects of independent states, the municipal laws of one will not be regarded by the other. 46 Blackstone identified these key autonomy values with the Law Merchant. Transnational merchants governed their own affairs through an informal, expeditious and prompt system of justice that suited their mercantile needs. 47 Merchant justice, in turn, was delivered through merchant-driven rules and procedures implemented by expert merchant judges. Blackstone's scheme included the following key attributes: (1) merchant judges were chosen from the ranks of merchants according to their knowledge of merchant practice and their standing among merchants; (2) they decided whether merchant usages were reasonable and fair; and (3) they weighed the need for predictable decisions against the virtue of responding to discrete merchant expectations.
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Blackstone's view of the Law Merchant, arguably, was inspired as much by how he thought it ought to function as how it operated in fact. His depiction of it as a uniform body of transnational law based on merchant practice also represented it as a stable regulatory system suited to England's position as a maritime power. 49 These propositions, as I have argued elsewhere, are tenuous at best. 50 In particular, they blur the line between justifiable truths and romantic accounts of the Law Merchant. They divine rather than describe a system of merchant justice delivered by expert merchant judges through autonomous Law Merchant institutions, insulated from non-merchant influences. They also fail to recognise that the 'law' ascribed to the Law Merchant was often not peculiar to it. Concepts like ex aequo et bono were espoused in Roman and canon laws well before the Law Merchant; they were also propagated by merchant and non-merchant courts alike. 49 For a challenge to this stable Law Merchant system, see Baker (n 2) 299 (arguing that, far from being distinct from the common law, common law courts adopted the Law Merchant determining when a party had established proof of a merchant usage); Tudsbery (n 2) 393 (discussing the incorporation of usages into the common law). 50 Nor does the notion of merchant courts addressing merchant needs take account of the impact of local authorities on merchant proceedings. 52 In granting licences and exemptions-to merchant guilds, fairs, markets and towns-local authorities had more than the interests of itinerant merchants in mind. They sought also to maintain stable relationships between merchants and local communities, to promote domestic employment and industry, and to preserve local laws from foreign influences. Far from being insulated from local interests, proceedings before Law Merchant courts were influenced by proceedings before local courts.
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A romantic image of post-medieval Law Merchant justice that depicts politically connected merchants exerting regulatory influence in the courts of kings and economic influence over guilds, fairs, and markets, invites critical analysis. With notable exceptions, such as associations of merchants organised by merchant guilds, 54 post-medieval merchants did not wield significant political or economic influence, except within their immediate merchant circles. They were not considered aristocrats; they were predominantly regarded as commoners, although some were financed, usually anonymously, by nobles who tacitly provided them with access to circles of influence.
55
Nor is it convincing to hold that post-medieval merchant law derived from merchant practice without also recognising that merchant law directed merchant practice. Merchant judges undoubtedly employed informal proceedings to respond to the immediate demands of merchants, such as by considering trade usages of merchants who dealt in perishable goods, and by reacting to fluctuating prices or irregular sources of supply in volatile markets. 56 Merchant judges also sometimes decided cases ex aequo et bono, according to that which they considered fair and good and in response to mercantile values operating 'outside of law' . decided disputes according to merchant practices operating outside of law, how did those practices exhaust the law, if at all? If Law Merchant judges based their decisions on conceptions of fairness and goodness, to what extent did they derive those conceptions from merchant practice, or from precepts which transcend those practices? I have considered these questions in a recent article, 58 and will deal with them further in Parts VI and VII below in relation to an allegedly modernised Law Merchant system.
IV. THE INFLUENCE OF VALUE PLURALISM ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW MERCHANT
According to a plural account of the medieval and post-medieval Law Merchant, 59 merchant courts did not limit themselves to merchant custom, practice or usage. They instead transposed both merchant and non-merchant practice into a loosely constituted system of law, dubbed 'the' Law Merchant. That Law Merchant, in turn, embodied a microcosm of merchant and non-merchant interests that were characterised as both informal and formal law. 60 In support of this plural account of the historical Law Merchant is the observation that it evolved incongruently over time, place and space; it varied in both form and substance from market to market, fair to fair, and port to port; 61 and it impacted diffusely upon foreign merchants, local merchants and consumers alike.
A critical response to a plural conception of the post-medieval Law Merchant is that it consisted of 'nothing but a heterogeneous lot of loose undigested customs, which is impossible to dignify with the name of a body of law' . 62 A more tempered account is that the substantive content of the Law Merchant was not hermetically sealed from other legal systems, but could be accounted for, however imperfectly, by the manner in which it accommodated these external influences upon it. 63 For example, the post-medieval 68 On the binding force of merchant pacts in the conception of pacta sunt servanda, see eg Trakman (n 2) 63.
See also Trakman (n 2) 17 (arguing that the 'merchants of Medieval Europe … were unable to develop their relationships purely on the basis of joint reliance, trust and cooperation'). 69 See above, text to nn 34 and 67 (discussing merchants' duty to perform their pacts in good faith). 70 See below, Part V (discussing further such preferential treatment of different merchant classes). 71 Guild leaders were often wealthy, influential, and skilled in drafting guild regulations and participating in guild litigation, including as merchant judges. On the reliance on guild leaders to help resolve disputes involving merchants in the 18th century Parisian Law Merchant Court, see Kessler (n 4) 79. On the significance of guild regulations in establishing, among other requirements, the 'just price' , see Kessler (n 4) merchants who occupied positions of privilege in comparatively free merchant towns, fairs and guilds realistically could enjoy only limited personal autonomy in an era in which personal freedom was circumscribed. These challenges to the insularity of an evolving Law Merchant do not deny either that merchant courts developed laws out of merchant practice or that those laws impacted upon legal developments beyond the Law Merchant. Commercial laws, such as the 'writing obligatory' as an informal method of proving a debt, and the power of attorney as an instrument of agency, are grounded to some extent in the practices of trans-regional merchants. What is in doubt is the generalised proposition that the Law Merchant of Blackstone's time was institutionally and functionally insulated from domestic systems of law; that merchant judges invariably resolved merchant disputes expertly and efficiently; and that merchant law was determined wholly by and for transregional merchants to the exclusion of other legal, political and social influences. It is one thing to inflate post-medieval Law Merchant practices into a self-sustaining and monist system of merchant justice. It is another to treat those practices as the solitary source of merchant law, to sequester them from the 'official law' of local authorities, and to disregard the impact of a plurality of communal and local interests upon 'merchant' law.
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One can certainly marvel at the magnificence and resilience of Law Merchant codes like the Laws of Rhodes and the Rolls of Oléron. But one also needs to appreciate that those codes were not formulated in mercantile seclusion, but in light of local, regional and trans-regional demands.
V. THE COMPLEX AUTONOMY OF A MODERN LAW MERCHANT
A modernised Law Merchant, to the extent that it exists, is conceived as being subject to discrete unifying values. One such unifying value is the freedom of trans-regional merchants to choose among institutions, including national and transnational legal systems, as an expression of their free will. A competing but equally unitary account of the Law Merchant is that, however liberalised the sixteenth century world order had become, the resulting 'nationalised' Law Merchant replicated institutionalised autonomy values that were imbedded in its medieval roots. A third autonomy value amalgamates the first two A fourth account of the Law Merchant ascribes a series of unitary attributes to it, including that:
• A modern Law Merchant exists.
• It serves as an informal, expeditious and fair institutional system of merchant justice consistent with its medieval progeny.
• It is nationalised within domestic legal systems, such as the civil law system, 74 the English common law, 75 and the UCC in the United States.
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• It is transnational in character, not unlike its trans-regional precursor.
• Its transnational character is expressed through international commercial codes and conventions to which states are parties, illustrated by the uniform law movement.
• A modern Law Merchant is also private.
• Its private character encompasses the autonomy of transnational merchants to conclude agreements, such as to resolve their disputes through choice of law and arbitration clauses.
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• It is expressed privately through the practices, usages and customs of merchants.
• It is formally and substantively independent as a system of merchant law.
• It is endorsed by transnational legal, economic and political institutions, by nationstates and by stratified communities of transnational merchants alike.
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The problem is that these attributes ascribed to the Law Merchant, inherently monist in nature, raise difficult questions. how nation-states and transnational regulators construe the efficiency and fairness of those choices. These regulatory determinations entail taking account of the self-interest and altruism not only of the merchants making choices, but also of those who are perceptibly impacted by such choices. 85 For example, the fact that merchants have the freedom to make choices of law still does not preclude nation-states from asserting sovereign authority over those choices, such as on domestic or transnational public policy grounds. Transnational merchants are also subject to transnational laws that are derived from the delegation or abrogation of sovereignty by nation-states. The formal autonomy of modern merchants to exercise acts of free will also does not stem from their per se rights to trade or invest transnationally, but from states granting them privileges to do so. 86 restrictions on the free will of transnational merchants are grounded in the national self-interest of the signatory states. For example, foreign merchants ought to enjoy no greater autonomy than that enjoyed by domestic merchants. 89 Insofar as states privilege transnational merchants over domestic merchants, they do so on social or economic grounds, for example in order to ensure that goods and services are available locally and to maximise the receipt of tax revenues from merchant trade. Such privileging is endemic in evolving Law Merchant precepts, as reflected in the social and economic benefits derived from privileging merchant guilds in medieval times.
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The particularised result is that merchant privileges derive from the manner in which nation-states choose to affirm or limit the liberalisation of merchant trade, whether those states act unilaterally or in concert with other nation-states, and whether they are motivated by self-interest or, at some level, by altruism.
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The unifying rationale for multistate regulation is similar to the rationale for the regulation of transnational merchants by individual states: to impose public constraints on private self-ordering by such merchants.
92 Such multistate regulation of merchant trade is also rationalised on social or economic grounds. Multistate regulation supposedly facilitates the transparent, ordered, efficient, uniform and fair conduct of merchant trade. It implements treaty structures that govern relationships between states and foreign investors that are too complex for nation-states to regulate unilaterally. 93 More contentiously, multistate regulation protects merchants from less affluent nation-states from exploitation by affluent states, as when less affluent states vote en bloc at multilateral forums. One way of reconciling the tension between self-regulation and state or multistate regulation of trade and investment is by subscribing to the dualism associated with two interlocking social contract theories. The first social contract is between a state and its citizens, to whom the democratically elected government of that state is accountable. This accords with established liberal theories of governance, namely, that a liberal state acts in accordance with the will of its electorate. 94 The second social contract is a treaty 89 On the grant of such privileges, see below, Part VI.B. 90 See eg Trakman (n 2) 28 (addressing the licensing of merchant guilds). 91 See below, Part IV.C (discussing this tension, particularly between the centralisation and decentralisation of the Law Merchant along national and local lines); see also 95 One result of these two social contracts is a compact by which a state reserves sovereign power over trade and investment in compliance with its duty to act for the betterment of its citizenry. The other result is that a state concludes regional or global agreements with other states to protect multilateral interests that include, but may diverge from, the domestic interests of any one treaty party, including those of its citizens. An 'in principle' difficulty with these interlocking social contract theories arises when the delegation of sovereignty by a state to the multilateral community conflicts with its social contract with its own citizens. An ancillary difficulty occurs when differentiating between the exercise of state sovereignty by individual states, such as in states regulating foreign merchants within their jurisdiction, and states subscribing to multilateral treaties that regulate such merchants by extraterritorial means.
Reconciling these two social contracts is particularly challenging in relation to the Law Merchant. One difficulty arises from the fact that nation-states inevitably absorband coopt-transnational Law Merchant values into their domestic legal systems not only differently but also inconsistently. 96 On the one side of the dualist divide, nation- enforce the privileges accorded to foreign investors arising from a regional investment treaty, even if those privileges trump the rights of domestic investors under local law.
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The dualist result is that a nation-state conceivably operates at polar extremes. At the one extreme, it accedes to a multilateral investment treaty by expressly or impliedly agreeing to apply a treaty in a manner that privileges the private investors of a treaty partner. At the other extreme, it is bound not to do so in conflict with countervailing rights arising out of a countervailing social contract with its own subjects. 101 The difficulty is in finding a middle ground between these extremes. That difficulty is evident when states attempt to retreat from their delegation of sovereignty to transnational institutions due to their countervailing responsibilities to local interests, as when they decline to compensate foreign investors under bilateral treaties on the ground that doing so conflicts with forum policy.
102
Nor has the 'liberalisation' of the Law Merchant effectively resolved this tension between individual autonomy, state and multistate action. Following the displacement of feudal fiefdoms and the growth of nation-states in the sixteenth century, states incorporated merchant customs, practices and usages into their domestic commercial codes in deference to transnational merchant practice. 103 105 See Sornarajah (n 101) 145-86 (discussing a challenge to the conception of international investment and the assertion of state authority over foreign investments).
B. A Uniform Law Merchant
The uniform law movement, 106 evident in international codes such as the UN Convention for Contracts on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 107 and adopted by such bodies as the UN Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 108 and the ICC, asserts the need to perpetuate a universal Law Merchant. 109 At issue is the ideological affirmation of a monist Law Merchant whose uniform formal attributes prevail over pluralistic conceptions of it at work.
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A structural critique of the uniform law movement as a manifestation of a monist Law Merchant is that it seeks to harmonise the substantive laws and legal cultures of different national systems, without adequately focusing on the functional needs of transnational merchants. 111 The driving force behind the uniform law movement is to reconcile competing-and often parochial-common and civil law traditions; and only secondarily to provide transnational merchants with expeditious and cost-effective rules A further critique is that efforts to devise a uniform Law Merchant lead to the perpetuation of the privileges enjoyed by wealthy states and their subjects. Wealthy trading nations of the West are perceived to remain financially dominant over global trade. One response to this perceived dominance is that developing states increasingly have sought to coopt the agendas of multilateral institutions such as the WTO, using their dominant numbers and to vote as a bloc. A counter-backlash is the tendency of wealthy trading nations to conclude bilateral trade and investment treaties in order not to have to rely on organisations such as the WTO to resolve trade disputes.
A perceived result is the partial breakdown of multilateralism as a pre-eminent means of regulating merchant trade in response to a plurality of competing state and non-state interests that are not necessarily commensurable with one another. Typically, developed states conclude bilateral agreements that not only sideline the WTO, but imbed the trade policies of a dominant treaty partner. Developing states comply in order to protect their fragile economies. The result is a multilayered twenty-first century Law Merchant in which trade and investment law have proliferated institutionally and functionally along disparate bilateral lines, 118 and which-as a result of conflicting state and multistate interests-is less cosmopolitan, cohesive and uniform than it has been historically. 119 What has emerged is a tendency on the part of states to nationalise transnational legal traditions and cultures differently, rather than seek to perpetuate an autonomous Law Merchant system. 120 What has resulted is a pluralistic conception of the Law Mer- A critique of state regulation of transnational trade and investment is that states potentially privilege some merchants over others. Coupled with this is the critique that a small cadre of wealthy merchant corporations enjoy quasi-public privileges derived from their economic dominance within transnational markets.
One way of redressing these critiques in the regulation of transnational trade and investment is to subscribe to the Law Merchant as an interdependent global 'village' . 124 That village is plural in nature, encompassing a heterogeneous assembly of transnational merchants that enjoy a revitalised yet disparate structural and functional autonomy to secure access to transnational markets from which they were historically excluded. Whether this functional conception of a pluralistic Law Merchant is sustainable is best considered through illustrations of those values at work, as outlined below.
A. A Flawed Illustration: The Cyberspace Law Merchant
An idealised illustration of a self-regulated twenty-first century Law Merchant is a Cyberspace Law Merchant. The imputed underpinnings of this Law Merchant are distinctly monist: as a unifying regime of cyberspace merchants and merchant institutions. However artificial this monist imagery may be, the illustration of a Cyberspace Law Merchant is valuable in demonstrating the flaws behind such imagery and in offering pluralistic alternatives.
The Objects
The Cyberspace Law Merchant is depicted as self-regulating voluntary associations of merchants in cyberspace which facilitate good practice among participating cyber-merchants. 125 For example, cyber-merchants can communicate instantly and en masse with one another across cyberspace. They can share their e-market intelligence on price gouging practices, product defects, and failure of price competition in mass e-markets. 126 They can use e-mediation and e-arbitration services to resolve disputes online in anywhere-anyplace actions, including against dominant cyber corporations.
127
A further idealisation of a cyberspace Law Merchant is that state and multistate regulators are able to regulate the cyber-market by invigorating a globally responsive system of Law Merchant justice. For example, regulators can scrutinise exclusion-ofliability clauses in e-supply contracts to determine whether they are procedurally and substantively unconscionable. They can redress bargaining abuses by striking down unfair provisions in such contracts and prosecute antitrust violations in transnational e-commerce. 128 
The Failings
The institutional and functional autonomy imputed to a twenty-first century private Cyberspace Law Merchant is nevertheless somewhat misplaced. It is arguable that largescale transnational suppliers exert quasi-public control over e-markets. They erect high-cost and high-stakes economic barriers to entry; 129 they use contractual and non-contractual mechanisms to limit claims of default brought against them; 130 and they aggressively deflect challenges for having acted anti-competitively in e-markets. 131 Further consternation revolves around dominant e-suppliers deploying multi-tiered processes of dispute avoidance strategically. These vary from standardising dispute resolution clauses meant to discourage time-consuming negotiations, to erecting barriers to face-to-face arbitration and commercial litigation brought against them. 132 A related concern is that nation-states affirm as much as they resist the quasi-public dominance of large scale e-market suppliers. States grant economic privileges to e-suppliers in order to increase tax revenues at the expense of e-market consumers. They marginalise the rights of sub-classes of e-merchants and e-consumers to equal treatment in e-markets in order to limit the state's costs of e-market regulation. They universalise 'the' Law Merchant as an abstraction in order to avoid having to devise an administrative structure to regulate it perceptibly and selectively. 133 
An Investment Law Merchant
The so-called twenty-first century Investment Law Merchant offers a further illustration of tensions among autonomy values in the Law Merchant, among other values that are imputed to it. 134 The perceived benefit of investment treaties between nation-states stems, not from the per se autonomy rights of home state merchants to invest in host states, but from perceived investment preferences that transnational merchants acquire from particular investment treaties between those home and host states. 135 A challenge for a universal investment Law Merchant is in redressing tensions that arise when host states grant benefits to investors from treaty partners 136 at the expense of merchants from non-treaty states, 137 and conceivably also at the expense of domestic markets, employees, consumers and the local environment. 138 This concern is not only that these treaty privileges accorded selectively to investment merchants promote inequalities in an Investment Law Merchant; it is also that nation-states have sound economic and social reasons to perpetuate those inequalities within investment markets that are already imperfectly competitive.
B. A More Functional Illustration: Transnational Arbitration
Transnational commercial arbitration serves as a final illustration of a monist conception of a self-ordering Law Merchant at work.
The Objects
Supporting the conception of an institutionally and functionally autonomous twentyfirst century Law Merchant is the allegedly ever-widening sphere of individual autonomy of transnational merchants to choose the form, substance and process of transnational arbitration to regulate their disputes. Their autonomy supposedly is reflected in specific observations regarding their contractual and non-contractual practices:
5. Transnational arbitrators are supposedly neutral in deciding merchant disputes between consenting parties, and operate out of neutral venues. 143 Based on these alleged factors, transnational arbitration is depicted as an informal, expert, cost-effective, expeditious process of dispute resolution. It is presented as a multi-tiered option that transnational merchants can combine with dispute prevention and avoidance measures. 144 Transnational arbitration is also idealised institutionally, as widely recognised by nation-states such as the United States, Canada and Mexico under Article 2022 of NAF-TA. 145 Arbitration is also conceived as institutionally and functionally autonomous from the parochial demands of nation-states and their domestic court systems. Transnational arbitration allegedly also benefits from a sophisticated institutional apparatus that integrates private, national and transnational elements. For example, transnational merchants adopt private transnational models of arbitration, such as the Model Arbitration Rules promulgated by UNCITRAL. 146 They incorporate the rules and procedures of transnational, regional and local arbitration centres into their private transnational contracts; they also rely on nation-states to enforce arbitral awards arrived at by arbitrators who apply those rules and procedures. 151 As a complement to these global centres, regional and local arbitration centres provide arbitration venues, rosters of arbitrators, arbitration procedures, literature on arbitration, and continuing education services leading to fellowships such as those offered under the auspices of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators. 152 These centres serve, inter alia, as impartial and low-cost venues that merchants select to resolve their transnational disputes. 153 Transnational arbitration centres supposedly differentiate their services from those of national courts on the basis of lower costs, faster and less formal proceedings, and the mercantile experience of presiding arbitrators whom disputing merchant parties choose at the outset. 154 What supposedly unifies transnational arbitration proceedings as the embodiment of Law Merchant values is their private, informal and commercial attributes. Proceedings are merchant-responsive in nature insofar as they take account of the parties' courses of dealings and usages of trade. Proceedings are not trammelled by localised requirements imposed national law courts, 155 unless the parties stipulate otherwise. 156 Arbitral deliberations and awards are ordinarily confidential, unlike public hearings before most domestic courts of law. Finally, transnational arbitration is allegedly comparable to the historical Law Merchant. Private arbitration centres compete openly with one another for merchant arbitration business, not unlike how courts at medieval merchant guilds and fairs competed for the business of itinerant merchants. 157 National courts support transnational arbitration when they recognise and enforce arbitration awards, except on such exceptional grounds as failure of natural justice. Such recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards by local courts is comparable to local courts recognising the decisions of medieval merchant judges. 158 However, these comparisons between Law Merchant institutions historically and transnational arbitration are overstated. In particular, the boundaries of modern transnational arbitration extend beyond disputes between transnational merchants. Nation-states submit to arbitral jurisdiction, such as in investor-state disputes brought by investors against investment treaty partners. 159 Arbitrators appointed to decide such investor-state disputes sometimes hold states accountable for unfairly taking the property of foreign investors in violation of equitable and fair treatment; and investment arbitration proceedings and awards often are publicised. 160 
The Failures
Even the example of a monist system of transnational arbitration, closely aligned with Law Merchant precepts, is far from impregnable. Responding to the assertion that transnational arbitration is prompt, affordable and decisive are the claims that it is complicated, expensive, and sometimes either a prelude to litigation or a mere stage in proceeding that culminates in the judicial review of an arbitral award. 161 While transnational arbitrators are ordinarily more experienced in transnational commerce than national courts, their competence to deal with complex legal and commercial issues is also subject to contention. 162 Even the monist proposition that transnational arbitration is private is contestable. Despite choosing arbitration, merchant parties face a myriad of variations of it, including markedly dissimilar arbitral rules and procedures. 163 Arbitral proceedings sometimes are unfamiliar to merchants; arbitral awards are determined ad hoc; and confidential awards do not set precedents that facilitate future merchant planning. 164 Furthermore, the monist depiction of transnational arbitration laws and procedures that are uniform in nature is subject to contestation in light of diverse procedures that are adopted by a plethora of local, regional and international arbitration centres. Far from being distinct from national courts, the rules and procedures adopted by regional arbitration centres are sometimes based on the rules and procedures of national courts. 165 
The Test
A decisive test is whether 'autonomous' transnational merchants freely choose transnational arbitration over the alternatives. Depicting such free choice, transnational merchants restrict, just as they expand, arbitral discretion through prescriptive choices of law and arbitration clauses. 166 For example, they can prohibit arbitrators from deciding by amiables composition or ex aequo et bono, or otherwise outside of the law. 167 They can avoid having their disputes arbitrated in jurisdictions in which the courts are likely to enforce those awards on national interest grounds. 168 They can often reasonably expect that transnational commercial arbitrators have a better grasp of merchant needs than do domestic courts of law. 169 Transnational commercial arbitration is nevertheless not a panacea of Law Merchant values that stands apart from diffuse national laws and domestic courts. Transnational arbitrators sometimes circumscribe the choices of law made by the merchant parties. They defer to forum law selectively on grounds that non-forum law chosen by the parties is unclear, not sufficiently widely understood, or not reasonably accessible or proven. 170 They decline to decide ex aequo et bono, not only on grounds that the disputants did not authorise them to do so; 171 they do so because, as arbitrators, they consider it 'lawless' to decide outside of law 172 and because prominent international jurists frown on arbitral awards that are reached ex aequo et bono. 173 Transnational arbitrators also enforce domestic law. For example, they apply domestic consumer protection and antitrust laws in order to avoid jurisdictional challenges on national interest grounds 174 or challenges to their arbitral competence. 175 National law courts also nullify arbitration awards for violating forum public policy, such as under Article V of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958. 176 Finally, it is arguable that, despite the theoretical freedom of merchants to make choices of law by contract, those choices, in practice, favour merchants from developed states. 177 Typifying such an 'uneven playing field' is the choice of law of a dominant and systems of law. Nor, like the historical Law Merchant, is transnational arbitration wholly 'private' or insulated from state scrutiny. 184 Transnational arbitration also functions along a multi-tier chain of dispute resolution, and is not inevitably a self-standing dispute resolution option that supersedes all other options. That chain commences with merchants self-regulating their transnational transactions by contractual and noncontractual means. It encompasses them negotiating, conciliating or mediating their differences in the event of conflict. It sometimes culminates in civil litigation before the domestic courts of a particular nation-state. The autonomy of transnational merchants is sometimes both formally and functionally constrained by substantive laws and procedures adopted by national courts.
VII. CONCLUSION
The examples given in the latter half of this article highlight the dysfunctional relationship between the abstract ideals that underpin theories of the Law Merchant and their practical manifestations in twenty-first century merchant environments. The aim of the article is not to disparage the development of Law Merchant precepts as inherently unsound; they are not so. The aim is rather to demonstrate that a plurality of Law Merchant values exists that operate formally, institutionally and functionally differently in disparate merchant contexts. The article does challenge Law Merchant idealism, such as the theoretical ideal of a spontaneously ordered Law Merchant in which merchants transact freely, unrestricted by intrusive state and multistate authorities. The reality is that transnational merchants are frequently subject to trade and investment entitlements that nation-states and multistate authorities grant preferentially. Scholars who treat a twenty-first century Law Merchant as the quintessence of a spontaneously self-ordered liberal Law Merchant ignore the stratified community of twenty-first century traders and investors who are only loosely conceived as 'transnational merchants' .
Abstract notions of a self-ordering and self-perpetuating Law Merchant are romantic at best. The examples of Cyberspace and Investment Law Merchants highlight this romance. A preferable approach is to recognise a plurality of Law Merchant values that serve as vibrant yet differentiated ways of resolving merchant disputes in a fair, expeditious and commercially sensitive manner. It is through this vibrancy that pluralistic Law Merchant values will have a sustainable future in the twenty-first century.
